777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208), worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulders. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand. (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /209/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sick-
784 ness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show
824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

771 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the
659 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

771 importance, and that their own profit and amusement lies much closer
659 to their hearts than the zeal of their mullahs. The Russian regime grants the Moslems absolute religious freedom, and General von Kauffmann has, in this connection, from the very beginning prohibited any sort of missionary activity and all proselytizing by Orthodox priests as well as missionaries of the other Christian faiths. He has even prevented the choice of Tashkent as the seat of the bishop of Turkestan in the interests of avoiding all possible friction between Moslems and Christians. Instead he relegated to Vernoye, /Alma Ata/ the capital of the province of Semirechiye, the population of which is almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Naturally General von Kauffmann is blamed for all this by the Orthodox clergy; the result has shown, however, how correctly he calculated. The tolerance exercised by the Russians toward the Moslems has not only not strengthened Islam in the Russian dominions of Central Asia, but on the contrary it has resulted in a striking indifference on the part of its followers, which one would not have believed possible among Moslems. During the entire fifteen years of my stay in Turkestan, not a single conflict between Moslems and Christian was acknowledged such as those often forthcoming in an India made insecure by English missionaries. Moslems and Christians get on as well with each other in Turkestan today, as one could wish from different Christian sects side by side. The Moslem dignitaries and men of rank take part spontaneously in church burials of Russian officials, and at the time of the last illness of General von Kauffmann, who was universally respected by the natives, the Moslem mullahs asked permission to pray for his recovery in the palace of the Governor General in company with the Russian priests.

8. The Administration of Justice.

671 The legal views of the sedentary population of Turkestan and those of the Kazakhs and other nomads are diametrically opposed; the former are much closer to our concepts of right and wrong. While the Kazakhs, as we have seen above, /in section not translated/ have views similar to the ancient Spartans and Teutons regarding mine and thine /210/ and recognize no difference between the civil and criminal nature of a crime, among the sedentary population theft is very strictly punished and a precise distinction is made between an offense which only involves harm to a fellow creature, and one directed at the social order. Actual written laws do not exist in the Central Asian

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1



[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 648 Tu. 569

## AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [91]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 659 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL1



Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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